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EWING v. GOLDSTEIN 
AND THE THERAPIST'S DUTY 
TO WARN IN CALIFORNIA 
In June 2001, Geno Colello, who was severely depressed, shot and 
killed Keith Ewing and then turned the gun on himself.' This tragic 
murder-suicide resulted in litigation against the mental-health 
professionals who treated Colello in his last days, alleging that they had 
failed to protect the victim from the patient? After hearing the facts in 
Ewing v. Goldstein, the California Court of Appeal for the Second 
District reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the 
defendant psychotherapist.3 In this case, the plaintiffs (Ewing's parents) 
alleged that Colello's father had informed the defendant therapist of a 
threat made against the victim by his son, and that this should have 
triggered the therapist's duty to warn of impending harm.4 Ultimately, 
the appellate court agreed with the plaintiffs and held that "[a] 
communication from a patient's family member to the patient's 
therapist" that relays a threat of violence against an identifiable victim 
imposes a duty to warn upon the therapist.5 This decision expanded the 
I Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 2004). 
2 Two suits were filed, one against Colello's private practice therapist and one against the 
hospital where he was eventually admitted. See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Ct. App. 
2004) and Ewing v. Northridge Hosp. Med. Ctr., 16 Cal. Rptr. 3d 591 (Ct. App. 2004). 
3 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864,875-76 (et. App. 2004). 
4 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 2004). It should be noted that the 
defendant denies ever having received such a communication from Colello's father, Defendant's 
Petition for Review, or Alternatively, Depublication at 5-6, Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 
(Ct. App. 2004) (No. 8127363 Civ. BI63112). 
5 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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criteria that trigger the duty to warn under California Civil Code Section 
43.92 and in its wake has left confusion in the mental-health community 
about when and how the duty arises.6 As a consequence of this decision, 
California therapists are now burdened by an expanded threat of civil 
liability on two fronts: (1) if the therapist fails to issue a warning 
triggered by a family member's communication, he or she may have 
breached a court-created duty; and (2) if the therapist does issue a 
warning, he or she may be· sued for breach of confidentiality.7 
The Ewing court erroneously expanded the types of events that can 
trigger a therapist's duty to warn, making it more difficult for mental-
health professionals to determine when this duty is invoked. The 
necessity and value of confidentiality in the context of the patient-
therapist relationship demands that mental heath professionals have clear 
guidelines regarding any duty they have to breach this confidentiality. 
Part I of this Note reviews California law concerning the treatment of 
potentially dangerous patients, including both the duty to warn and the 
civil commitment process.s Part II examines the impact of the Ewing 
decision on the therapist's duty to warn.9 Part III proposes the 
Lanterman-Petris-Short Act ("LPS Act") as a suitable framework for 
dealing with potentially dangerous patients that, if used correctly, 
obviates the need to expand the triggering criteria for the duty to warn 
and circumvents the negative ramifications of the Ewing decision.1O The 
Note concludes that this framework provides a superior compromise, 
better protecting both patient confidentiality and potential victims. I I 
1. THE TREATMENT OF DANGEROUS PATIENTS 
California law provides for two parallel approaches that mental-
health professionals and law enforcement can, and in some cases must, 
take when a patient being treated for mental illness becomes a threat to 
6 Letter from Dr. A. Steven Frankel, Ph.D., J.D., Legal Counsel of the California 
Association of Psychology Providers, to The Hon. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice - Associate 
Justices of the California Supreme Court (Sept. 23, 2004) (on file with the author); "Prior to the 
Second District's decision it was clear to psychologists that the duty to warn arose only when a 
patient made a serious threat of physical violence. That certainty is now lost." /d. 
7 Psychotherapists: Duty to Warn: Hearing on A.B. 733 Before the Assembly Committee on 
the Judiciary, 2005-06 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2005) (statement of Assemblyman Joseph Nations, 
member, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary). 
8 See infra notes 12-75 and accompanying text. 
9 See infra notes 76-154 and accompanying text. 
10 See infra notes 155-182 and accompanying text. 
II See infra Part IV. 
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self or to others. 12 These two approaches, which came into being at 
about the same time thirty years ago, are the therapist's duty to warn, 
commonly called a Tarasoff warning, and the civil commitment 
process. 13 
A. THE THERAPIST'S DUTY TO WARN 
Tarasoff v. The Regents of the Uniw;rsity of California established 
the therapist's duty to warn. 14 The facts in Tarasoff were tragic. IS 
Tatiana Tarasoff and Prosenjit Poddar were both students at the 
University of California at Berkeley ("the University") in the late 
1960's.16 They met while attending folk dancing classes at the 
International House and saw each other weekly during the fall of 1968.17 
On New Year's Eve, Tarasoff and Poddar kissed, and Poddar 
misunderstood this as a sign of a serious relationship.18 Tarasoff quickly 
made it clear that she was not romantically interested in Poddar. 19 At 
about this time, he began to manifest serious emotional and 
psychological problems.2o 
The following summer, Tarasoff went abroad and Poddar was 
encouraged by friends to seek psychological treatment. 2 I He began 
seeing Dr. Lawrence Moore, a clinical psychologist at the University's 
student health center.22 In late August, Dr. Moore notified the campus 
police that he believed that Poddar might be a danger to himself or 
others.23 This warning was based on Poddar's communication in therapy 
that he intended to kill a girl, readily identifiable as Tatiana Tarasoff, 
when she returned from Brazi1.24 The campus police arrested Poddar 
12 See infra notes 14-75 and accompanying text. 
13 CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.) and CAL. 
WELF. & lNST. CODE §§ 5000-5579 (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
14 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d334 (1976). 
15 For a good review of the Tarasoff case, see Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim's 
Knowledge Shrinks the Psychotherapist's Duty to Warn and Protect, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL'y I (2004); Sheri Morgan and Carolyn I. Polowy, Social Workers and the Duty to Warn, NAT'L 
ASS'N OF SOc. WORKERS, LEGAL ISSUE OF THE MONTH (February 2005), 
hUp:llwww.naswdc.org/ldf/legal_issue/default.asp. 






22 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 556 (1974). 
23 People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 345 (1974). 
24 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 556 (1974). 
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based on this information?5 Despite Dr. Moore's warning that Poddar 
could at times appear quite rational, the police released him because he 
appeared reasonable and promised to stay away from Tarasoff.26 Poddar 
then stopped seeing Dr. Moore for treatment.27 The psychiatric staff of 
the student health center made no further attempt to civilly commit 
Poddar for treatment?S On October 27, 1969, Poddar went to Tarasoffs 
house and was told by her mother to leave.29 He returned later that day 
when Tarasoff was home alone?O When she refused to speak to him, 
Poddar shot her with a pellet gun and stabbed her to death.3! 
Tarasoff s parents brought suit against the University asserting that 
the treating professionals had a duty to warn their daughter of the 
impending danger that Poddar had posed.32 Initially, the California 
Supreme Court agreed and held that, "[ w ]hen a doctor or a 
psychotherapist, in the exercise of his professional skill and knowledge, 
determines, or should determine, that a warning is essential to avert 
danger arising from the medical or psychological condition of his patient, 
he incurs a legal obligation to give that warning.,,33 This new rule 
disturbed many in the mental-health treatment community, particularly 
given concerns about how accurately mental-health professionals could 
predict future violent behavior and fears that informing patients of the 
limits of confidentiality attendant to the duty to warn would result in 
reluctance to discuss harmful thoughts and feelings, thereby increasing 
the very danger that the California Supreme Court sought to prevent.34 
After its initial decision in Tarasoff, the California Supreme Court 
agreed to rehear the case. On rehearing, the court rendered a decision 
25 [d. 
26 [d. 
27 People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 344-345 (1974). 
28 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553,556 (1974). 
29 People v. Poddar, 518 P.2d 342, 345 (1974). 
30 [d. 
31 [d. 
32 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553, 556 (1974). 
33 [d.; Note that under CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 
Reg. Sess.) the term "psychotherapist" encompasses a range of professionals who provide mental-
health services, including, but not limited to, psychiatrists, psychologists, clinical social workers, and 
marriage and family therapists. 
34 Daniel J. Givelber, William J. Bowers & Carolyn L. Blitch, Tarasojf, Myth and Reality: 
An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 443, 450 (1984); 'The California 
Supreme Court has erected new barriers to ... treatment [of violence-prone patients] by creating a 
vaguely defined liability that will deter all those who attempt to provide such psychotherapy, as well 
as the many private and public agencies which employ them. Further, by restricting the assurance of 
confidentiality available when treatment is given, the court's holding limits the effectiveness of that 
treatment." /d. 
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that, despite the concerns of the mental-health community, expanded the 
duty to warn even further. 35 The court held that, "[ w ]hen a therapist 
determines, or pursuant to the standards of his profession should 
determine, that his patient presents a serious danger of violence to 
another, he incurs an obligation to use reasonable care to protect the 
intended victim against such danger. ,,36 This broadened the duty 
imposed upon therapists from one of warning a potential victim to one 
that called for the active protection of the potential victim.37 
Coming close on the heels of the rehearing of Tarasoffwas the case 
of Hedlund v. Superior Court. 38 In Hedlund, defendant therapists were 
sued for failing to warn a victim of their patient's threat against her. 39 
The California Supreme Court's unique holding in this case was its 
conclusion that the therapists' duty of care extended beyond the intended 
victim to her minor child because it was foreseeable that he could be near 
her and emotionally traumatized by an attack against his mother.40 The 
court concluded that when a therapist evaluates the risk of harm posed 
and takes steps to protect the potential victim, this must include a 
consideration of the risk of trauma to individuals who are "in close 
relationship" to the object of the threat.41 
The expanding liability imposed upon therapists under Tarasoff and 
Hedlund motivated the introduction of Assembly Bill ("A.B.") 1133 in 
1985.42 The author of the bill, citing the California Medical Association 
("CMA"), stated that, "[t]he rulings in Tarasoff and Hedlund have placed 
mental health therapists in a very real dilemma. While having to be ever 
mindful of protecting the public, therapists must also be concerned that 
35 Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.. 551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976). 
36 1d. (emphasis added); The court defined "reasonable care" in the following manner: "The 
discharge of this duty may require the therapist to take one or more of various steps, depending upon 
the nature of the case. Thus it may call for him to warn the intended victim or others likely to apprise 
the victim of the danger, to notify the police, or to take whatever other steps are reasonably 
necessary under the circumstances." Id. 
37 Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 340 (1976). 
38 Hedlund v. Superior Ct., 669 P.2d 41 (1983). At first glace, the Ewing court's discussion 
of Hedlund is interesting in that the latter case focuses on imposition of a duty to foreseeable 
victims, while the former involves the expansion of the criteria that trigger the duty to warn. The 
court likely discussed the case not because Hedlund was analogous to Ewing, but because the earlier 
case was integral to the ultimate codification of a narrowed duty under CAL. ClY. CODE § 43.92, the 
statute at issue in Ewing. 
39 Hedlund v. Superior Ct., 669 P.2d 41, 43 (1983). 
40 Id. at 46-47. 
41 ld. at 47. 
42 Psychotherapist Liability for Failure to Warn: Hearing on A.B. 1133 Before the Assembly 
Committee on the Judiciary, 1985 Regular Sess. (Cal. 1985) (statement of Assemblyman McAlister, 
member, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary). 
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requiring them to warn potential victims will frequently result in the 
breach of patients' confidentiality." 43 The bill's author also pointed out 
that the CMA went on to contend that the public is better protected 
"when troubled persons are encouraged to seek therapy, unafraid that 
their every utterance could lead to hospitalization or police 
involvement." 44 California Civil Code Section 43.92, the legislation that 
emerged from A.B. 1133, codified a duty to warn that narrowed therapist 
liability from the expansive holdings of Tarasoff and Hedlund.45 This 
new statute established that the duty to warn would arise only when the 
patient communicated a threat of physical violence against a potential 
victim.46 
Despite Section 43.92, in the recent case of Ewing v. Goldstein the 
court of appeal has once again begun to expand the application of the 
duty to warn, as the California Supreme Court had done in the Tarasoff 
and Hedlund decisions, this time broadening the events that would 
trigger the duty.47 In Ewing, the court ruled that a patient threat can 
trigger the duty to warn if this communication is relayed to the therapist 
by a patient's family member and not by the patient himself.48 
The facts of the case that led to this decision are as dreadful as those 
in Tarasoff.49 Geno Colello was a patient of Dr. David Goldstein for four 
years.50 Colello was a former Los Angeles Police Department officer 
and was treated over that period for problems related to both his work 
and his ex-girlfriend, Diana Williams.51 In 2001, Colello's depression 
and anger problems increased when he learned that Williams had begun 
a relationship with a new man, Keith Ewing.52 As Colello's condition 
43 Id. at 2. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 1. 
46 The full text of CAL. CIY. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.) states: "(a) There shall be no monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall 
arise against, any person who is a psychotherapist as defined in Section 10 10 of the Evidence Code 
in failing to warn of and protect from a patient's threatened violent behavior or failing to predict and 
warn of and protect from a patient's violent behavior except where the patient has communicated to 
the psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or 
victims. (b) If there is a duty to warn and protect under the limited circumstances specified above, 
the duty shall be discharged by the psychotherapist making reasonable efforts to communicate the 
threat to the victim or victims and to a law enforcement agency." 
47 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864,866 (CI. App. 2004); "We conclude that the trial 
court too narrowly construed section 43.92." Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. at 866-68. 
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deteriorated, Dr. Goldstein became concerned that Colello might harm 
himself, and he suggested that the patient consider voluntary in-patient 
treatment. 53 Soon thereafter, Colello's father allegedly contacted Dr. 
Goldstein to report that his son had communicated that he was feeling 
suicidal and was considering harming Williams's new boyfriend.54 
Goldstein urged Colello's father to admit his son for in-patient treatment, 
and Colello agreed to enter Northridge Hospital Medical Center that 
same evening. 55 The next day, the treating psychiatrist at Northridge 
Hospital, Dr. Gary Levinson, decided to discharge Colello. 56 When 
Goldstein was informed of this development he immediately contacted 
Levinson and urged him not to discharge the patient.57 Nevertheless, 
over Goldstein's objections, Levinson discharged Colello, concluding 
that the patient was not suicida1.58 The next day, Colello shot Ewing and 
then committed suicide.59 
The Ewing court, faced with these dreadful facts, held that, "[a] 
communication from a family member to a therapist, made for the 
purpose of advancing a patient's therapy, is a 'patient communication' 
within the meaning of section 43.92.,,60 Beyond the facts of the Ewing 
case, this holding broadens the instances in which a therapist has a duty 
to warn, imposing a duty based not only on threats made by the patient 
but also on communications from third parties made about the patient's 
alleged threats.61 
B. THE CIVIL COMMITMENT PROCESS 
The Lanterman-Petris-Short Act ("LPS Act") provides for civil 
commitment to a psychiatric facility under certain conditions and may be 
used to protect against the risk posed by a potentially violent mentally ill 
individua1.62 This act came into force in 1969, just a few years before the 
Tarasoff case, and emerged as part of the trend toward 
53/d. at 867. 
54 [d. Again, note that Goldstein denies ever having received such a communication from 
Colello's father. Defendant's Petition for Review, or Alternatively, Depublication at 5-6, Ewing v. 
Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. S127363Civ. BI63112). 
Sess.). 





60 [d. at 866. 
61 [d. 
62 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5579 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
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deinstitutionalization that swept the country during the 1960's and 70'S,63 
Deinstitutionalization refers to the movement to shift the treatment of the 
mentally ill away from large psychiatric hospitals toward community-
based treatment models,64 The effect of deinstitutionalization was to 
decrease the number of people treated in psychiatric hospitals by eighty-
five percent over a period of four decades, while the population as a 
whole grew by thirty-six percent during that same time,65 The LPS Act 
exemplified California's "preference for liberty" and was intended to end 
the indefinite and involuntary detention of the mentally ill,66 It remains 
virtually unchanged as the law regarding the civil commitment of the 
mentally ill in the state tOday,67 
The LPS Act provides that upon probable cause an individual may 
be taken into custody and placed in a mental-health facility on a short-
term basis if it is determined that, as a result of a mental disorder, the 
individual is "gravely disabled" or is a danger to self or to others,68 The 
initial detention spans seventy-two hours and is intended to provide for 
observation and crisis management.69 To establish probable cause, the 
committing authority, usually a staff psychiatrist or psychologist, 
considers information about the historical course of the individual's 
mental disorder among other factors, including information provided by 
the patient's family members,70 If, after the initial period of detention, 
the treating professionals determine that the individual continues to pose 
a danger to himself or others, he may be detained for a further fourteen-
day involuntary commitment.71 Within four days of the start of the 
fourteen-day hold, a certification hearing before a Hearing Officer must 
take place to allow for review of the probable cause,72 
63 Id.; For a good review of the process of deinstitutionalization and the LPS Act, see 
Meredith Karasch, Where Involuntary Commitment, Civil Liberties, and the Right to Mental Health 
Care Collide: An Overview of California's Mental Illness System, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 493 (2002). 
64 THOMAS F. OLTMANNS AND ROBERT E. EMORY, ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY 2ND ED., 679, 
(Prentice Hall 1998). 
65 Id. at 664. In 1955, more than 500,000 people in the United States were confined to 
mental hospitals; by 1994 that number had shrunk to fewer than 72,000, Id. 
66 Meredith Karasch, Where Involuntary Commitment, Civil Liberties, and the Right to 
Mental Health Care Collide: An Overview of California 's Mental Illness System, 54 HASTINGS L. J. 
493, 497 (2002). 
Sess.). 
67 CAL. WELF. & lNST. CODE §§ 5000-5579 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
68 See id. § 5150. 
69 See id. §§ 4132, 5150. 
70 See id. § 5150.05(a) & (b). 
71 See id. § 5250. 
72 See id. §§ 5254, 5256.l. Hearing officers are generally not judges; they are typically 
lawyers or mental-health professionals. 
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Ultimately, the individual may be confined for up to 180 days under 
an LPS conservatorship if he or she continues to pose a significant risk of 
danger.73 This long period of involuntary confinement is checked 
through a process of judicial evaluation, in which it must be shown by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the individual continues to be gravely 
disabled or a danger to self or others.74 Therefore, while the LPS Act 
was enacted to prevent the unjust confinement of the mentally ill, it 
provides an avenue through which mental-health professionals and law-
enforcement officers can protect a patient and potential victims from the 
consequences of the patient's illness through the use of enforced 
treatment.75 
II. THE THERAPIST'S DUTY TO WARN IN THE WAKE OF EWING 
The Ewing court expanded the range of events that can trigger a 
therapist's duty to warn to include patient threats relayed to the therapist 
by a family member, thereby exposing therapists to increased liability 
that will hurt the profession and the people it aims to treat.76 Instead, the 
LPS Act, in conjunction with the original interpretation of Section 43.92, 
should be used as a framework for dealing with dangerous patients 
without the negative ramifications of the Ewing court's decision. 
A. THE EWING DECISION 
The case of Ewing v. Goldstein is illustrative of the legal adage, 
"[b]ad facts make bad law.,,77 Faced with a tragic set of circumstances, 
the appellate court sought to impose liability on the treating therapist and 
in the process erroneously decided a number of legal points.78 First, the 
court did not adhere to the plain meaning of California Civil Code 
Section 43.92 in its interpretation of the duties mandated under this law, 
with a resulting emergence of amorphous liability standards. 79 Second, 
in establishing an expanded duty to warn under California Civil Code 
Section 43.92, the court failed to define what relationship is required 
between the patient and the third party in order to trigger the duty to 
73 See id. § 5300. 
74 See id. § 5346. 
75 Conservatorship of Rodney M., 58 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 516 (Ct. App. 1996). 
76 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 866 (Cl. App. 2004). 
77 Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647. 659 (1992). 
78 Petition for Review, or alternatively, Depublication at 2-3, Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 864 (Cl. App. 2004) (No. SI27363 Civ. B 163112). 
79 [d. at 14-17. 
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warn.80 Finally, the court incorrectly relied on the testimonial privilege 
for family-member communications established in Grosslight v. Superior 
Court to find a duty to warn when a family member communicates an 
alleged threat made by an adult patient.81 
1. The Plain Meaning of Cal. Civ. Code §43.92 
When the language of a statute is clear, the court must adhere to its 
plain meaning.82 The judiciary must heed the intent of legislators by 
applying the law as it is unambiguously written.83 With this in mind, 
California Civil Code Section 43.92 establishes that in order to initiate 
the duty to warn the patient must communicate to the therapist "a serious 
threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or 
victims." 84 In the examination of Section 43.92, the Ewing court 
surprisingly conceded that, "[s]ection 43.92 refers only to a patient's 
communication to his or her psychotherapist .... Read literally, section 
43.92 would preclude the imposition of liability if information about the 
patient's violent intentions .... were received by a therapist from any 
source other than the patient.,,85 Without identifying the specific 
statutory language it considered ambiguous, the court nonetheless 
concluded that the phrase "the patient has communicated to the therapist" 
should be read to include communications made by family members to 
the therapist. 86 This contradicts the plain meaning of California Civil 
80 See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 2004) where the term "family 
member" is not defined; "A communication from a family member to a therapist, made for the 
purpose of advancing a patient's therapy, is a patient communication within the meaning of section 
43.92." [d.; "We are not faced with and do not address the situation in which a third party who is not 
a member of the patient's immediate family, but who may be involved in his therapy in some manner 
(an intimate or close friend), conveys the information of the patient's potential dangerousness to the 
therapist." [d. at 873 n.10. 
81 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 872 (Ct. App. 2004); Grosslight v. Superior 
Court, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278,281 (Ct. App. 2004). 
82 See Dafonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 144 (1992), citing Rojo v. Kliger, 801 P.2d 
373,377 (1990), quoting Solberg v. Superior Court. 561 P.2d 1148. 1158 (1977). 
83 Day v. City of Fontana, 19 P.3d 1196, 1199 (2001), citing People v. Lawrence, 6 P.3d 228, 
235 (2000); "[the judiciary must) presume the lawmakers meant what they said, and the plain 
meaning of the statute governs." [d. 
84 CAL. ClY. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.) 
(emphasis added). 
85 Ewing v Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 869 (Ct. App. 2004). 
86 [d. at 868; The Ewing court's only mention of statutory ambiguities was the statement that 
"Section 43.92 does contain certain facial ambiguities." [d.; "Notably, the Ewing court never 
identified the ambiguous word or phrase within Civil Code Section 43.92. The Ewing court could 
not identify any ambiguous language." Defendant's Petition for Review, or Alternatively, 
Depublication at 15, Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. S127363 Civ. 
8163112); Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 2004). 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss2/8
2006] THERAPIST'S DUTY TO WARN IN CALIFORNIA 303 
Code Section 43.92 and was therefore an unnecessary and unauthorized 
f · . 87 act 0 mterpretatlOn. 
The Ewing court's questionable decision regarding how to interpret 
Section 43.92 was accompanied by a review of the legislative history of 
the statute.88 The court stated that its ostensible goal was to interpret the 
statute in such a way as to remain faithful to the original intent of the law 
makers.89 This statement is belied by the court's ultimate conclusion 
that, "the fact that the family member is not technically a 'patient' is not 
crucial to the statute's purpose.,,90 
A careful review of the legislative history of Assembly Bill 1133, 
which was enacted as Section 43.92, reveals that this supposition is 
inaccurate.91 The first sentence of the analysis provided by the bill's 
author states, "[t]his bill narrows the liability of certain mental health 
professionals for failing to warn persons foreseeably endangered by the 
violence of their patients." 92 The author of the bill affirmed that the 
decisions in Tarasoff and Hedlund placed mental-health practitioners in a 
"very real dilemma" and that the bill sought to "limit the 
psychotherapist's liability for failure to warn." 93 Prior to Ewing, courts 
had also concluded that Section 43.92 was enacted to limit the liability of 
therapists for failure to warn.94 In its interpretation of the duty to warn, 
the Ewing court expanded, rather than limited, the range of 
circumstances that will trigger the duty, thereby dramatically increasing a 
psychotherapist's exposure to liability and establishing a precedent 
counter to the legislative intent behind Section 43.92.95 This was a 
violation of the court's own statement that "[t]he primary objective in 
construing a statute is to ascertain and effectuate the underlying 
legislative intent." 96 
The court's decision to open Section 43.92 to interpretation and to 
87 See Dafonte v. Up-Right, Inc., 828 P.2d 140, 144 (1992), citing Rojo v. K1iger, 801 P.2d 
373,377 (1990), quoting Solberg v. Superior Court, 561 P.2d 1148,1158 (1977). 
88 Ewing v Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 868-71 (Ct. App. 2004). 
89 1d. at 869, citing Allen v. Sully-Miller Contracting Co., 47 P.3d 639, 642 (2002); The court 
sought to "[c]hoose the construction that comports most closely with the apparent intent of the 
lawmakers, with a view to promoting rather than defeating the general purpose of the statute." Id. 
90 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864,872 (Cl. App. 2004). 
91 Psychotherapist Liability for Failure to Warn: Hearing on A.B. 1133 Before the Assembly 
Committee on the Judiciary, 1985 Regular Sess. at I (Cal. 1985) (statement of Assemblyman 
McAlister, member, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary). 
92 Id. 
93 Jd. at 2. 
94 Barry v. Turek, 267 Cal. Rptr. 553, 556 (Ct. App. 1990). 
95 Defendant's Petition for Review, or Alternatively, Depublication at 16, Ewing v. 
Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. SI27363 Civ. B(63112). 
96 See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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broaden the duty to warn has caused uncertainty and confusion in the 
mental-health community regarding what a therapist is obligated to do 
and when liability can be imposed.97 Because defendant Dr. Goldstein 
executed his duties to the full extent of the then-existing law, current 
therapists must be left to wonder whether the Ewing court's expansion is 
only the beginning.98 The effect is to shift the ground under 
practitioners' feet such that even in trying to follow current law, liability 
may nonetheless result if a court decides to expand the parameters of a 
statute based on the facts of a single case. This uncertainty plagues the 
mental-health profession today.99 
2. Failure to Define "Family Member" 
The expanded rule established by the Ewing court is that "[a] 
communication from a patient's family member to the patient's therapist, 
made for the purpose of advancing the patient's therapy, is a 'patient 
communication' within the meaning of section 43.92.,,100 The court went 
on to observe that "[w]e are not faced with and do not address the 
situation in which a third party who is not a member of the patient's 
immediate family, but who may be involved in his therapy in some 
manner (e.g., an intimate or close friend), conveys the information of the 
patient's potential dangerousness to the therapist." 101 The court's failure 
to define who qualifies as a family member, as well as how to treat 
individuals who may be close to the patient but not legally related, has 
left therapists in an untenable situation.102 
Because therapists are legally prohibited from communicating with 
third parties, including family members, regarding an adult patient's 
treatment absent the patient's consent therapists will have no way to 
97 For a roster of questions raised by the court's decision, see Defendant's Petition for 
Review, or Alternatively, Depublication at 26-27, Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Ct. 
App. 2004) (No. SI27363 Civ. BI63112). 
98 See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 867 (Ct. App. 2004). Goldstein attempted to 
have Colello held for seventy-two hours under the LPS Act. [d. 
99 See infra notes 134-137 and accompanying text for steps taken by the Los Angeles 
Country Department of Mental Health in the wake of the Ewing decision. 
100 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 868 (Ct. App. 2004). 
101 [d. at 873 n.1O. 
102 Psychotherapists: Duty to Warn: Hearing on A.B. 733 Before the Assembly Committee on 
the Judiciary, 2005-06 Regular Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2005) (statement of Assemblyman Joseph Nations, 
member, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary); "Following the recent appellate decision, Ewing v. 
Goldstein, which would extend this exception to communications to the therapist made by family 
members, the current state of the law is an unworkable amalgam of conflicting legal opinions and 
statutes. We believe that legislation is needed to clarify the legal responsibilities of psychotherapists 
in such situations." [d. 
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confirm whether the communication is accurate, is made by a family 
member, or whether the family member is acting maliciously or in the 
best interests of the patient. 103 The difficulty here is two-fold. First, 
how does a therapist verify that the individual with whom he or she is 
speaking is a family member, within the meaning of the rule, as a 
"condition precedent" to issuing a warning? Second, if the therapist does 
somehow determine, within the confines of confidentiality, that this 
individual is a family member, how can he or she immediately verify that 
the communication is credible if the duty to warn has already been 
triggered? Significantly, even in the relatively short period of time since 
the Ewing decision was issued, the ambiguity regarding whose 
communication will trigger a warning has caused practitioners to err on 
the side of caution and opt to break confidentiality when a 
communication comes from "any credible source," not just from 
someone they were able to determine was a family member. 104 
Therefore, patients may already be paying the price for the confusion 
engendered among professionals by the Ewing decision. 
3. When Is a Family-Member Communication a Patient 
Communication? 
The novel holding in the Ewing case was the notion that a 
communication coming from someone other than the patient could 
trigger the duty to warn. IDS In reaching this conclusion, the Court 
examined the interplay between two statutory schemes that exist in 
tension: Section 43.92, which codifies the duty to warn, and California 
Evidence Code Sections 1010-1014, which codify the legal privilege for 
communications between a psychotherapist and a patient. 106 In its 
decision, the Ewing court ostensibly sought to find the appropriate 
balance between these two statutes, one that protects confidentiality and 
103 Scull v. Superior Court, 2S4 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26 (Ct. App. 1988); "[Ilt is well settled in 
California that the mere disclosure of the patient's identity violates the psychotherapist-patient 
privilege." Id.; See also Letter from Dr. A. Steven Frankel, Ph.D., J.D., Legal Counsel of the 
California Association of Psychology Providers, to The Hon. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice -
Associate Justices of the California Supreme Court (Sept. 23, 2004) (on file with author). 
104 Letter from Marvin J. Southard, D.S.W., Director of Mental Health for the County of Los 
Angeles Department of Mental Health, to Department of Mental Health Staff (Sept. 30, 2004) (on 
file with the author). 
105 Ewing v. Goldstein, IS Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 873 (Ct. App. 2004). 
106 Ewing v. Goldstein, IS Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 872 (Ct. App. 2004); "Because section 43.92 
was prompted by Tarasojfand Hedlund, and because Tarasojfitselfis rooted in the psychotherapist-
patient privilege, the two statutory schemes should be accorded complimentary interpretations, if at 
all possible." [d. (internal citations omitted). 
13
Smith: Therapist's Duty to Warn in California
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2006
306 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36 
the other that may require its breach. 107 
Crucial to the court's analysis in Ewing was the case of Grosslight 
v. Superior Court, which broadened the scope of privileged 
communications to include those made by patient family members. lOS 
Specifically, Grosslight established that, "[w]here ... the communication 
to the parent is to further the child's interest in communication with, or is 
necessary for transmission of information to ... a psychotherapist, the 
communication is protected by the pertinent statutory privilege.,,109 
When the Ewing court broadened the duty to warn to include 
communications made by family members of the patient, it based this 
expansion largely on what it believed to be the complementary expansion 
that had occurred with the psychotherapist-patient privilege under 
G I · h 110 ross zg t. 
The Ewing court should not have relied on Grosslight for this 
expansion. In so doing, it may have struck an inappropriate balance 
between the duty to warn and the duty to maintain confidentiality. III It is 
legally significant that the patient in Grosslight was a sixteen-year-old 
minor child. ll2 When the child's parents communicated with her 
therapist regarding treatment, they were acting not merely as interested 
parties, but were acting as her legal guardians entitled to access 
confidential information regarding their daughter's care. ll3 When the 
Ewing court expanded the criteria that can trigger the duty to warn, it 
relied on the Grosslight analysis, but Grosslight involving an adult 
patient. I 14 Adult patient treatment is privileged information, even from 
family members, unless the patient has explicitly waived his right to 
confidentiality with respect to this party.ll5 The status of parental 
communications for a minor is therefore substantially different than for 
107 Id.; "Our conslrUction harmonizes the competing principles discussed above .... " Id. 
108 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 872 (Cl. App. 2004) citing Grosslight v. 
Superior Court, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 (Cl. App. 1977)(emphasis added). 
109 Grosslight v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 280 (Cl. App. 1977) (internal citation 
omitted). 
110 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 872 (Cl. App. 2004). 
III Letter from Dr. A. Steven Frankel, Ph.D., J.D., Legal Counsel of the California 
Association of Psychology Providers, to The Hon. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice - Associate 
Justices of the California Supreme Court (Sept. 23, 2004) (on file with author). 
112 Grosslight v. Superior Court, 140 Cal. Rptr. 278, 279 (Cl. App. 2004). 
113 See CAL. FAM. CODE § 6924(d) (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.); 
"The mental health treatment or counseling of a minor authorized by this section shall include the 
involvement of the minor's parent or guardian unless ... the involvement would be inappropriate ... 
. " Id. 
114 See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 866 (Cl. App. 2004) (stating that Colello 
had been employed as a police officer for several years). 
115 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1014(c) (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
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an adult patient. 116 The Ewing court appears to have dangerously 
conflated two separate legal issues - the privilege of a parent's 
communications made in furtherance of a minor child's treatment and the 
duty to warn that arises when an adult patient communicates a threat. 117 
In doing so, the Ewing court has tipped the balance too far toward breach 
at the expense of confidentiality. 118 
B. ISSUES EMERGING FROM THE EWING CASE 
The California Association of Psychology Providers has asserted 
that the Ewing decision will have ramifications beyond the confines of a 
single case, because "[t]he Court of Appeals has created a dangerous 
situation that can subject our members to potential civil suits for either 
acting or failing to act on threats communicated by supposed family 
members. This decision will significantly undermine patient 
confidentiality.,,1l9 A major issue to be examined is whether patient 
confidentiality may be jeopardized in instances in which it is not 
currently possible for therapists to predict the likelihood of violence with 
a sufficient level of accuracy based on family communications. 
1. The Impact of Ewing on Therapist-Patient Confidentiality 
The bedrock of effective psychotherapy is confidentiality, which 
assures the patient that whatever he or she says in therapy will be kept 
private. 120 It is this knowledge that enables the patient to speak freely 
and to overcome feelings of embarrassment, fear, or shame. 121 Even the 
United States Supreme Court has affirmed the importance of 
116 Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 6924(d) (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.) with CAL. EVlD. CODE § 1014(c) (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
117 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 872-873 (Ct. App. 2004). 
liS Letter from Dr. A. Steven Frankel, Ph.D., J.D., Legal Counsel of the California 
Association of Psychology Providers, to The Hon. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice - Associate 
Justices of the California Supreme Court (Sept. 23, 2004) (on file with author); "[W]e believe that 
the Court of Appeals' decision is contrary to prior decisions of the Supreme Court that have held that 
intrusions of the psychotherapist-patient privilege are to be limited in scope and narrowly construed . 
. . . This decision will significantly undermine patient confidentiality." [d. 
119 Letter from Dr. A. Steven Frankel, Ph.D., J.D., Legal Counsel of the California 
Association of Psychology Providers, to The Hon. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice - Associate 
Justices of the California Supreme Court (Sept. 23, 2004) (on file with author). 
120 Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim's Knowledge Shrinks the Psychotherapist's 
Duty to Warn and Protect, 21 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y 1,7 (2004); 'The cornerstone of ... 
therapy ... has always been confidentiality. For any patient, speaking freely is difficult. The 
necessary factor in overcoming the natural resistance to complete candidness is the belief that 
anything said in therapy will be kept in the confidence of the therapist." [d. 
121/d. 
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confidentiality to effective psychotherapy. 122 State and federal 
judiciaries safeguard therapist-patient confidentiality through an 
evidentiary privilege protecting communications between these 
parties. 123 The origins of the privilege can be traced back millennia to 
122 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 10 (1996); "Effective psychotherapy ... depends upon an 
atmosphere of confidence and trust in which the patient is willing to make a frank and complete 
disclosure of facts, emotions, memories, and fears. Because of the sensitive nature of the problems 
for which individuals consult psychotherapists, disclosure of confidential communications made 
during counseling sessions may cause embarrassment or disgrace. For this reason, the mere 
possibility of disclosure may impede development of the confidential relationship necessary for 
successful treatment." [d. 
123 For federal privilege see FED. R. EVID. 501. For state privileges see ALA. CODE § 34-26-2 
(West, WESTLAW through 2005 First Spec. Sess.); ALASKA RULES OF EVID., R. 504. (West, 
WESTLAW through 2005 legislation); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-2085 (West, WESTLAW 
through January 2006 legislation); ARK. RULES OF EVID., R. 503 (West, WESTLA W through 
January 1, 2006 amendments); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1010-1028 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 
First Spec. Sess.); COLO. REv. STAT. § 13-90-107(0) (West, WESTLAW through end of 2005 First 
Reg. Sess. of 65th Gen. Assembly); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-146c (West, WESTLAW through 
2006 Supp. to Conn. Gen. Statutes); DEL. RULES OF EVID., R. 503 (West, WESTLAW through 
amendments received by Dec. 1,2005); D.C. CODE § 14-307 (West, WESTLAW through Jan. 25, 
2006); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 90.503 (West, WESTLAW through Chap. 362 (End) of 2005 Spec. 'B' 
Sess. of Nineteenth Legislature); GA. CODE ANN. § 37-3-166 (West, WESTLAW through end of 
2005 Spec. Sess.); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 504.1 (West, WESTLAW through 2004 Reg. Sess.); IDAHO 
CODE § 54-2314 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 Leg. Sess.); 740 ILL. CaMP. STAT ANN. 110/1 
(West, WESTLAW through P.A. 94-727 of 2006 Reg. Sess.); IND. STAT. § 25-33-1-17 (West, 
WESTLAW through 2005 First Reg. Sess. of 114th Gen. Assembly); Ky. RULES OF EVID. RULE 507 
(West, WESTLAW current with amendments received through Jan. 1, 2006); LA. REv. STAT. § 
13:3734 (West, WESTLAW through all 2005 Regular and First Extraordinary Sess. Acts); ME. 
RULES OF EVID., R. 503 (West, WESTLAW current with amendments received through March 1, 
2006); MD. Crs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-109 (West, WESTLAW through Chap. 17 of 2006 
Reg. Sess.); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 20B (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 43 of the 2006 
2nd Annual Sess.); MICH. CaMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.1750 (West, WESTLAW through PA 2006, 
No. I-59); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 595.02 (West, WESTLAW through 2006 Reg. Sess. laws through 
Chapter 171); MISS. CODE § 73-31-29 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 Fifth Extraordinary Sess.); 
Mo. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 210.140, 337.055 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 First Extraordinary 
Sess. of the 93rd Gen. Assembly); MONT. CODE ANN. § 26-1-807 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 
Reg. Sess. of the 59th Legislature); NEB. REv. STAT. § 27-504 (West, WESTLAW through the First 
Reg. Sess. of 99th Legislature (2005»; NEV. REv. STAT. § 49.215-49.245 (West. WESTLAW 
through 2005 73rd Reg. Sess. and the 22nd Spec. Sess. of Nevada Legislature); N.H. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 330-A:19 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 Reg. Sess.); N.J. STAT. ANN. 45: 14B-28 (West, 
WESTLAW through L.2006, c.2); N.M. RULES OF EVID., R. 11-504 (West, WESTLAW current with 
amendments received through Feb. 1,2006); N.Y. CIY. PRAc. L. & R. § 4507 (West, WESTLAW 
current through L.2006, chapters 1 to 6 and 8); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-53.3 (West, WESTLAW 
through 2005 Reg. Sess.); N.D. RULES OF EVID., R. 503 (West, WESTLAW current with 
amendments received through Feb. 1,2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 2503 (West, WESTLAW 
through Chapter 1 of 2005 First Extraordinary Sess.); OR. REv. STAT. § 40.230 (West, WESTLA W 
current with amendments received through Jan. 1, 2005); 42 PENN. C.S.A. § 5944 (West, 
WESTLAW current through Act 2005-96); TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-60-114 (West, WESTLAW 
through end of 2005 First Reg. Sess.); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-60-114 (West, WESTLAW through 
end of 2005 First Spec. Sess. 2005); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1612 (West, WESTLAW through First 
Session of 68th Biennial Session 2005); VA. CODE § 8.01-400.2 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 
Reg. Sess. 2005); WASH. REV. CODE § 18.83.110 (West, WESTLAW 2006 legislation through Feb. 
16
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the Hippocratic Oath, which states, "[W]hatever I see or hear in the lives 
of my patients, whether in connection with my professional practice or 
not, which ought not to be spoken of outside, I will keep secret, as 
considering all such things to be private.,,124 This privilege is legally and 
ethically recognized because in order for therapy to be successful, the 
patient must feel safe enough to reveal painful, embarrassing, and 
disturbing thoughts and feelings to the therapist. 125 
No evidentiary privilege is absolute, and the majority of states 
permit breach when the health or safety of the patient or a third party is 
at risk. 126 However, beyond the narrow confines of circumstances in 
which breach is legally permissible, therapists must maintain client 
confidentiality.127 Thus, maintaining client information and records in 
such a way as to minimize any chance of inappropriate disclosure is of 
the utmost importance. 128 To this end, a practitioner is generally 
prohibited even from disclosing the names of the patients he or she is 
seeing in treatment to any outside party. 129 Participating in 
psychotherapy continues to carry a social stigma and the protection of 
confidentiality is the primary way that society enables individuals, 
despite this perceived "shame," to seek the treatment they need. 130 
15,2006); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 905.04 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 Act 105); WYO. STAT. ANN. 
§ 33-38-113 (West, WESTLAW through 2005 Reg. Sess.). 
124 Hippocratic Oath, available at http://www.nlm.nih.govlhmdlgreek/greek_oath.html(last 
modified Feb. 17,2006). 
125 Sheri Morgan and Carolyn I. Polowy, Social Workers and the Duty to Warn, I, NAT'L 
ASS'N OF Soc. WORKERS, NASW LEGAL DEFENSE fuND LEGAL ISSUE OF THE MONTH SERIES, 
(2005), at http://www.naswdc.orglldfllegaUssueidefault.asp. 
126 Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim's Knowledge Shrinks the Psychotherapist's 
Duty to Warn and Protect, 211. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'y I, 10 (2004). 
127 Smith v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147-48 (Ct. App. 1981). 
128 AM. PSYCHOL. ASS'N ETHICAL STANDARDS, § 4.01 at 
http://www.apa.orglethics/code2oo2.html#4; "Psychologists have a primary obligation and take 
reasonable precautions to protect confidential information obtained through or stored in any 
medium, recognizing that the extent and limits of confidentiality may be regulated by law or 
established by institutional rules or professional or scientific relationship." /d. 
129 Smith v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 145, 147-48 (Ct. App. 1981); "It is well-settled 
that the disclosure of the identity of the patient violates the physician-patient privilege where such 
disclosure reveals the patient's ailment. The instant case presents an analogous situation, for 
disclosure of the identity of a psychotherapist's patient name inevitably reveals the confidential 
information, namely, that the patient suffers from mental or emotional problems." [d. (citations 
omitted). 
130 Rhonda Rowland, First step in beating depression is admitting it, CABLE NEWS 
NETWORK (2002) at 
http://archives.cnn.coml2oo2IHEAL TH/conditionsl07 I 16/cov .depression.ceo/index.htrnl; 'They kept 
their secret [of depression] because of the stigma associated with mental illness. Only their family 
and closest friends knew. 'I thought it might adversely affect my business relationships or my 
personal relationships.'" [d.; See also Smith v. Superior Court, 173 Cal. Rptr. 145, 148 (Ct. App. 
1981 ). 
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The Ewing case has disturbing implications for therapist-patient 
confidentiality. It has vastly expanded the instances in which a therapist 
may be compelled to breach confidentiality without providing clear 
guidelines as to when and how this duty is triggered. 131 A fundamental 
difficulty that arises is reconciling how a therapist could have contact 
with a family member who relays news of a patient's threat when the 
therapist is legally prohibited from communicating with third parties, 
family or not, regarding an adult patient's treatment without that 
patient's consent. 132 Further, therapists are left in the dark in determining 
which individuals are considered "family members" within the scope of 
the rule and, therefore, which communications can legally compel them 
to breach confidentiality. 133 This uncertainty has already started to erode 
the established boundaries of confidentiality, as exemplified by a recent 
Los Angeles County Department of Mental Health memo. 134 In the wake 
of the Ewing decision the Department advised its staff that a therapist 
should issue a warning consistent with Section 43.92 not only when 
threat information is communicated by a patient family member, as 
required under Ewing, but when the information is communicated by any 
other potentially credible source.135 
It is important to note that the Los Angeles Department of Mental 
Health has issued a directive that goes beyond what even the Ewing court 
131 Letter from Dr. A. Steven Frankel, Ph.D., J.D., Legal Counsel of the California 
Association of Psychology Providers, to The Hon. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice - Associate 
Justices of the California Supreme Court (Sept. 23, 2004) (on file with the author); "Prior to the 
Second District's decision it was clear to psychologists that the duty to warn arose only when a 
patient made a serious threat of physical violence. That certainty is now lost." /d. 
132 Scull v. Superior Court, 254 Cal. Rptr. 24, 26 (Ct. App. 1988); "Essential to psychotherapy 
are confidential personal revelations about matters which the patient is nonnally reluctant to discuss. 
Frequently, a patient in analysis will make statements to his psychiatrist which he would not make 
even to the closest members of his family .... It is well settled in California that the mere disclosure 
of the patient's identity violates the psychotherapist-patient privilege .... The rationale for this rule 
is that the harm to the patient's interest of privacy is exacerbated by the stigma that society often 
attaches to mental illness." [d. 
133 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 874 (Ct. App. 2004). 
134 Letter from Marvin J. Southard, D.S.W., Director of Mental Health for the County of Los 
Angeles Department of Mental Health, to Department of Mental Health Staff (Sept. 30, 2004) (on 
file with the author). 
135 Letter from Marvin 1. Southard, D.S.W., Director of Mental Health for the County of Los 
Angeles Department of Mental Health, to Department of Mental Health Staff (Sept. 30, 2004) (on 
file with the author); In relevant part, the letter states, "When a patient, a patient's family member, or 
other credible informant communicates to any staff in a DMH program a serious threat of physical 
violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or victims, then actions consistent with Civil Code 
section 43.92, the Tarasoff Decision, and Welf. & Instit. Code section 5328(r), which pennits the 
disclosure of confidential infonnation to avert serious threat based on communications from sources 
other than the patient, must be implemented in order to protect the third party." [d. (emphasis in 
original). 
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established as law in advising its staff to treat a communication from 
"any credible informant" as a patient communication for the purposes of 
the duty to warn. 136 This type of risk-management strategy, which 
anticipates a further expansion of the duty to warn, is disturbing but not 
surprising. Even thirty years ago in the Tarasoff decision, one of the 
dissenting justices noted that, "given the decision not to warn or commit 
must always be made at the psychiatrist's civil peril, one can expect that 
most doubts will be resolved in favor of the psychiatrist protecting 
himself.,,137 This added encumbrance on therapist-patient confidentiality 
may ultimately end up endangering the very people that the Ewing court 
sought to protect - potential victims - by discouraging individuals with 
disturbing or aggressive impulses from seeking the treatment they so 
desperately need. 138 
2. Predicting Patient Violence 
Justice Mosk's concurring and dissenting opmlOn in Tarasoff 
indicated several concerns about holding therapists to a standard of 
violence prediction, including the following: 
In the light of recent studies it is no longer heresy to question the 
reliability of psychiatric predictions. Psychiatrists themselves would 
be the first to admit that however desirable an infallible crystal ball 
might be, it is not among the tools of their profession. It must be 
conceded that psychiatrists still experience considerable difficulty in 
confidently and accurately diagnosing mental illness. Yet those 
difficulties are multiplied manyfold when psychiatrists venture from 
diagnosis to ~rognosis and undertake to predict the consequences of 
such illness. 1 9 
In the almost thirty years since the Tarasoff decision was issued, 
136 See Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864,866 (Ct. App. 2004); Letter from Marvin J. 
Southard, D.S.W., Director of Mental Health for the County of Los Angeles Department of Mental 
Health, to Department of Mental Health Staff (Sept. 30, 2004) (on file with the author). 
137 Tarasoffv. Regents ofUniv. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 361(1976) (Clark, J., dissenting). 
138 Request for Judicial Notice to Cal. Sup. Court, Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 
(Ct. App. 2004) (After a Decision by the Court of App. 2d Dist., Div. 8, 2d Civ. No. BI63112), 
attaching a Letter from Howard Gurevitz, President, California Psychiatric Association, to Senator 
Bill Lockyear, Senate Judiciary Committee (June 27, 1985) (on file with the author); "A patient who 
is disturbed about confusing, aggressive thoughts must be able to discuss this condition thoroughly 
with the psychotherapist. Such persons could be reluctant to seek treatment if confidentiality were to 
be breached and to allow such a person to continue without treatment could be potentially 
dangerous." [d. 
139 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 354 (1976) (quoting People v. Burnick, 
535 P.2d 352, 365 (1975)). 
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research in the field of violence prediction and risk assessment has 
yielded considerable advancements. 140 This research has identified 
actuarial instruments, or systematized decision-making scales, as the best 
tools for the prediction of violence. 141 These tests statistically assess an 
individual for risk of violence, analyzing such factors as age, childhood 
behavior problems, and prior violent offenses, and they typically have a 
predictive value of between .75-.77 (with 0.5 being equal to chance).142 
Examples of instruments of this type currently used in the field are the 
Violence Risk Appraisal Guide ("V RAG") and the HCR_20.143 Scales of 
this type have been shown in several empirical studies to be superior to 
the clinical assessment of a patient for risk of violence. 144 
These advances make it tempting to believe that therapists should be 
able to assess the potential for violence in their patients, at least with a 
higher level of accuracy than when Tarasoff originally came down. 
Unfortunately, this is not the case.145 Three principal factors make the 
application of the actuarial scales described above, the only type of 
assessment that has shown any validity, of questionable utility within the 
context of a Tarasoff "duty to warn" situation.146 First, scales such as 
the VRAG were developed for use among violent recidivists, such as 
prisoners about to be released from prison.147 They were not developed 
for use with individuals who have no history of violence (the population 
most likely to be in out-patient treatment with a private practice 
therapist) and as such it is doubtful whether they would be useful in 
predicting first-time violent acts. 148 Second, actuarial instruments predict 
the likelihood of violence over a long time span, usually in the range of 
years.149 A predictive time span of this length is of limited utility in a 
duty-to-warn situation where a therapist may be obligated to take 
140 Randy Borum & Marisa Reddy, Assessing Violence Risk in Tarasoff Situations: A Fact-
Based Model of Inquiry, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 375, 376 (2001). 
141 Martin Grann et al., Actuarial Assessment of Risk for Violence: Predictive Validity of the 
VRAG and the Historical Part of the HCR-20, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 97, 98 (2000). 
142 Id. 
143 Id. at 99. 
144 Id. at 98. 
145 Randy Borum & Marisa Reddy, Assessing Violence Risk in Tarasoff Situations: A Fact-
Based Model of Inquiry, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 375, 378 (2001); "[Tlhe Tarasofflanguage suggests 
that the clinician should be held to the existing standards of his or her profession, despite the fact 
that no such explicit standards for these situations currently exist." Id. 
146 See infra notes 147-153 and accompanying text. 
147 Martin Grann et aI., Actuarial Assessment of Risk for Violence: Predictive Validity of the 
VRAG and the Historical Part of the HCR-20, 27 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 97, 99 (2000). 
148 Randy Borum & Marisa Reddy, Assessing Violence Risk in Tarasoff Situations: A Fact-
Based Model of Inquiry, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 375, 378 (2001). 
149 Id. at 377. 
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reasonable steps to inform a potential victim immediately.15o Finally, 
actuarial risk assessment is not designed to identify risk with regard to a 
particular victim or a particular level of violence. 151 Rather, these tools 
seek to assess the risk of general violence that the patient may be 
involved in at some point in the future. 152 Again, this type of information 
is not useful within a Tarasoff warning situation, which requires that the 
victim be "reasonably identifiable" and that there be a "serious threat of 
physical violence.,,153 
Under the rule of Ewing, the therapist's ability to predict violent 
behavior on the part of the patient becomes an issue of heightened 
importance. Ewing asks the therapist not only to be able to assess the 
risk of violence with the patient in front of him or her, which is an 
uncertain endeavor to begin with, but also to potentially act on a violence 
risk assessment based on a third-party communication about the 
patient. 154 This added level of complexity imposed upon the already 
difficult business of risk assessment could move prediction from the 
realm of challenging to mere guesswork. 
III. A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE 
This Note is not intended to definitively state where the balance 
between therapist-patient confidentiality and the protection of the public 
welfare should lie. The judiciary has already commented on this 
question when it stated that, "[t]he protective privilege ends where the 
public peril begins.,,155 However, what is needed and what can be 
proposed is a means of clarifying therapists' duties and rights regarding 
the treatment of potentially violent patients, enabling those in the 
profession to enact proper risk-management procedures, and allowing 
their patients genuine informed consent for treatment. 
To this end, the therapist's duty to warn under Section 43.92 should be 
narrowly construed, as it was before the Ewing decision, and the duty should not 
be triggered by family-member communications to the therapist. If a therapist is 
somehow confronted with a communication of a threat relayed by a family 
member that he or she believes is genuine, the option of temporary civil 
commitment under the LPS Act should be considered as a more appropriate and 
150 See CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
151 Randy Borum & Marisa Reddy, Assessing Violence Risk in Tarasoff Situations: A Fact-
Based Model of Inquiry, 19 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 375, 377 (2001). 
152 Id. 
153 CAL. Crv. CODE § 43.92(a) (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
154 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 2004). 
155 Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 347 (1976). 
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already existing alternative to expanding the criteria that trigger the duty to 
warn. 
A. A RETURN To THE PRE-EWING UNDERSTANDING OF THERAPIST'S 
DuTY To WARN 
The Ewing court's decision resulted in a duty to warn that went 
beyond the intent of Section 43.92 and has resulted in considerable 
confusion in the mental-health community.156 This uncertainty in the 
field could act as a deterrent for those who desperately need treatment 
but who are dissuaded by the lack of clear guidelines regarding the 
confidentiality of sensitive communications.157 Any proposed remedy 
must address the need for clarity under Section 43.92. 
At this point, a clarification of Section 43.92 by statute is the most 
effective means of spelling out therapists' duties. 158 After the appellate 
court's decision in Ewing, the defendant petitioned the California 
Supreme Court for review. 159 This petition was denied, and the Supreme 
Court also declined the alternative request to depublish the lower court's 
decision. 16o Thus, a statutory remedy is required to delineate the scope of 
the duties under Section 43.92 and how they are triggered. 
Assembly Bill No. 733 was introduced to the California Assembly 
in February 2005 with the sponsorship of the California Association of 
Marriage and Family Therapists; the bill sought to "clarify and affirm the 
original intent of the psychotherapists' duty to warn.,,161 The author of 
the bill stated that "[t]he Ewing decision is at odds with current law, is 
unworkable in practice, and will have an adverse effect on the ability of 
156 Psychotherapists: Duty to Warn: Hearing on A.B. 733 Before the Assembly Committee on 
the Judiciary, 2005-06 Regular Sess., at 3 (Cal. 2005) (statement of Assemblyman Joseph Nations, 
member, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary). 
157 Brian Ginsberg, Tarasoff at Thirty: Victim's Knowledge Shrinks the Psychotherapist's 
Duty to Warn and Protect, 21 J.CONTEMP.HEALTHL. &POL'Y I, 13 n.65 (2004). 
158 Psychotherapists: Duty to Warn: Hearing on A.B. 733 Before the Assembly Committee on 
the Judiciary, 2005-06 Regular Sess., at 2 (Cal. 2(05) (statement of Assemblyman Joseph Nations, 
member, Assembly Committee on the Judiciary); "Following the recent appellate decision, Ewing v. 
Goldstein, which would extend this exception to communications to the therapist made by family 
members, the current state of the law is an unworkable amalgam of conflicting legal opinions and 
statutes. We believe that legislation is needed to clarify the legal responsibilities of psychotherapists 
in such situations." Id. 
159 Defendant's Petition for Review, or Alternatively, Depublication, Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 864 (Ct. App. 2004) (No. SI27363 Civ. BI63112). 
160 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 864 (Ct. App. 2004). 
161 Psychotherapists: Duty to Warn: Hearing on A.B. 733 Before the Assembly Committee on 
the Judiciary, 2005-06 Regular Sess., 1-2 (Cal. 2005) (statement of Assemblyman Joseph Nations, 
member, Assembly Committee on the judiciary). 
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psychotherapists to treat patients effectively.,,162 The proposed language 
of A.B. 733 seeks to limit the instances in which the duty to warn is 
invoked to those threats against potential victims that are communicated 
to the therapist directly by the patient. 163 This additional language would 
further clarify the intent of the legislature and would restore transparency 
and certainty to the application and scope of Section 43.92. 
Unfortunately, the bill was amended in the Assembly in May 2005 
to add the following potentially problematic language: "(c) 
Notwithstanding subdivision (a), if a patient's threat has been 
communicated to the therapist by a third party, the therapist is 
encouraged, but not required, to contact the patient to the extent that the 
therapist reasonably believes is necessary to assess whether the patient 
poses a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably 
identifiable victim or victims." 164 The difficulty with this language, and 
one of the likely reasons that the bill has been sidelined for a two-year 
review, is that it introduces ambiguity to the reading of the statute with 
suggestive but non-binding language. 165 Ultimately, this would have the 
result of perpetuating, not remedying, the confusion surrounding Section 
43.92 after Ewing. 
In sum, the intent of the proposed amendment of Section 43.92(a) 
under A.B. 733 is desirable and would correctly result in a firm 
clarification of the duties under Section 43.92 as they existed prior to 
Ewing.Under the proposed language, a therapist would not be required to 
issue a warning based solely on potentially unreliable hearsay 
information received from a third party. 166 This portion of the 
amendment should be retained and ultimately adopted. The proposed 
addition of Section 43.92(c) under A.B. 733, however, should not be 
adopted. To include suggestive but non-binding language in the statute, 
as this section of the amendment does, is to invite continued vagueness 
into the interpretation of the statute. Ultimately, if the proposed 
162 1d. at I. 
163 Introduction of A.B. 733, 2005-06 Regular Sess., at 2 (proposed Feb. 17, 2005) (proposal 
by Assemblyman Joseph Nations to amend Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (a)); "(a) There shall be no 
monetary liability on the part of, and no cause of action shall arise against, any person who is a 
psychotherapist as defined in Section 1010 of the Evidence Code in failing to warn of and protect 
from a patient's threatened violent behavior or failing to predict and warn of and protect from a 
patient's violent behavior except where the patient himself or herself has communicated to the 
psychotherapist a serious threat of physical violence against a reasonably identifiable victim or 
victims." Id. (emphasis added). 
164 A.B. 733, 2005-06 Regular Sess. (Cal. 2005), as amended in Assembly May 10,2005. 
165 View the status of A.B. 733 at http://www.leginfo.ca.govlbilinfo.html. 
166 Introduction of A.B. 733, 2005-06 Regular Sess., at 2 (proposed Feb. 17, 2005) (proposal 
by Assemblyman Joseph Nations to amend Cal. Civ. Code § 43.92 (a)). 
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amendment to subsection (a) is not enacted, therapists will be left to 
guess when and by whom the duty to warn is triggered, and the resulting 
confusion will have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. 
B. CIVIL COMMITMENT UNDER THE LANTERMAN-PETRIS-SHORT ACT 
("LPS") 
A crucial detail to understand at the outset is that the introduction of 
the LPS Act as a means of addressing situations involving a dangerous 
patient and a potential victim is not intended to advocate a blanket 
expansion of the civil commitment process. Instead, the suggestion is 
that the LPS Act already provides a mechanism for dealing with an 
extreme situation such as that raised in Ewing, while also containing 
explicit safeguards that clarify therapists' duties and limit liability, 
protections not made clear in the amorphous duty-to-warn standard 
established in Ewing. 167 The LPS Act, codified under California Welfare 
and Institutions Code Sections 5000-5579, is an existing method of 
dealing with dangerous patients that avoids the problems that have 
already been raised with the expansion of the triggering criteria for the 
duty to warn, an expansion that makes an understanding of the duty 
unworkably vague in practice. 
Several features of the LPS Act suggest that it would be a better 
alternative than expanding the criteria that trigger the duty to warn in 
situations analogous to Ewing. First, and perhaps most significantly, the 
therapist must consider family-member communications regarding the 
patient's mental state in making the decision to civilly commit under the 
LPS Act. 168 This stands in direct contrast to the plain language of the 
Tarasoff warning under Section 43.92, which specifies that the therapist 
must issue a warning when "the patient has communicated to the 
psychotherapist" an imminent threat of violence against an identifiable 
third party.169 Thus, turning to the LPS Act in situations in which a 
credible threat is relayed by a family member is permissible within the 
existing parameters of the Act and would avoid the confusion 
engendered by the Ewing court's interpretation of Section 43.92. 
Second, acting under the LPS Act when a family-member 
communication has triggered a therapist's concern enables the therapist 
to further verify and assess this risk through the use of the seventy-two-
167 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 5000-5579 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.). 
168 See id. § 5150.05(b). 
169 CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
24
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 8
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol36/iss2/8
2006] THERAPIST'S DUTY TO WARN IN CALIFORNIA 317 
hour hold under Section 5150.170 This added protection, for both the 
patient and the therapist, is not present under the current reading of 
Section 43.92 by the Ewing court, which compels a therapist to break 
confidentiality and warn based solely upon the family-member 
communication. 171 Moreover, after civilly committing an individual, if 
the treating professionals conclude that the patient does pose an 
imminent threat to an identifiable victim, they may still issue a warning, 
the same level of protection provided by Section 43.92.172 Thus, the 
crucial difference between the two responses lies not in the level of 
protection afforded the potential victim, for warnings can be issued in 
both cases. 173 Rather, it is the fact that the LPS has the safeguard of 
further evaluation of the patient, which allows the therapist to assess the 
credibility and accuracy of the family member's communication before 
deciding to break confidentiality, instead of being compelled to warn 
based on the communication alone. 174 
Finally, under the LPS Act there are two explicit safeguards in 
terms of liability for breaking confidentiality based on family-member 
communications that are absent from Section 43.92. First, under the LPS 
Act, if a therapist acting on his or her own assessment and informed by 
family-member communications decides to issue a warning, he or she is 
unambiguously protected by the statute against liability for breaking 
confidentiality.175 Under the Ewing court's interpretation of Section 
43.92, there is no overt equivalent protection when a therapist is 
compelled to issue a warning based on a family-member communication 
that later turns out to be false. 176 In the same vein, the LPS Act contains 
an explicit safeguard against a potentially false or malicious family-
170 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150 (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
171 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 871 (Ct. App. 2004); "If information about the 
serious threat of grave bodily injury is brought to the therapist's attention through a member of the 
patient's family rather than the patient, may the therapist be relieved of an obligation to act on the 
information, no matter how credible, simply because it has not come directly from the 'patient'? We 
do not believe so." ld. 
172 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328(r) (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.); compare with CAL. CIV. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.). 
173 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328(r) (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.); compare with CAL. CIv. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.). 
174 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §5328(r) (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.); compare with CAL. CIY. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.). 
175 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§5259.3(a), 5259.3(b) (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 
2006 Reg. Sess.). 
176 Ewing v. Goldstein, 15 Cal. Rptr. 3d 864, 866 (Ct. App. 2004). 
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member communication by imposing civil liability on a party who lies to 
the therapist about a potential threat. 177 No such unequivocal deterrent 
exists under the current law governing the expanded duty to warn under 
Ewing, engendering a serious problem, because as one commentator 
noted, 
[F]amily members may not have the best interests of the patient at 
heart, may have many agendas, may not be able to assess and predict 
future violent behavior .... As psychologists, we know the reality is 
that family members are often the major source of stress to the patients 
we treat. Family members can cause, and have caused physical, 
sexual, and emotional abuse, which psychologists end up treating. 
The Court of Appeals has now empowered these family members to 
force a psychologist to make a report that could have dire 
consequences for a patient's emotional health and business 
interests. 178 
Thus, a family member who may have an ulterior motive for 
informing a therapist about a purported threat is clearly discouraged from 
doing so under the LPS Act. 179 This explicit deterrent is not contained 
within Section 43.92.ISO 
All the features of the LPS Act described above, from the 
consideration of family communications, to providing time for 
assessment, to overt liability protections, have already gathered loose 
threads left dangling in the Ewing decision. lSI This is accomplished 
through statutory language that makes explicit both the duties and 
protections that are at the core of a Ewing duty-to-warn scenario, and it 
suggests that potential victims can be protected without resorting to a 
problematic expansion of the triggering criteria for the duty to warn. IS2 
177 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150.05(c) (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
Sess.); "[TJhe person making the statement shall be liable in a civil action for intentionally giving 
any statement that he or she knows to be false." [d. 
178 Letter from Dr. A. Steven Frankel, Ph.D., J.D., Legal Counsel of the California 
Association of Psychology Providers, to The Hon. Ronald M. George, Chief Justice - Associate 
Justices of the California Supreme Court (Sept. 23, 2004) (on file with the author). 
Sess.). 
179 CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5150.05 (West, WESTLAW through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. 
180 CAL. CN. CODE § 43.92 (West, WESTLA W through Ch. 12 of 2006 Reg. Sess.). 
181 See supra notes 168-178 and accompanying text. 
182 Integral to the success of the LPS Act in this context, but beyond the scope of this article, 
are a number of process improvements that the mental-health community should consider regarding 
the protocols designed for dangerous patients. First, the community should advocate for the 
expansion of psychology licensing and continuing education requirements to include mandatory 
training on the LPS Act, ensuring widespread and consistent dissemination of information on its use. 
Second, the mental-health community should also work to improve the links between private 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
In the careful balance between the welfare of potential victims and 
the protection of confidential psychotherapy, a bright-line rule should be 
established. The business of violence prediction is simply too fraught 
with ambiguity to expect therapists to maintain client confidentiality 
while attempting to navigate the murky waters of a hasty expansion to 
the duty to warn. This is precisely the situation that the Ewing court 
created when it expanded the therapist's duty to warn to include 
communications of a possible threat relayed by a patient's family 
member. Unless the therapist's legal obligations are clarified in the face 
of these imprecise expectations, we will likely see a preference for over-
protective risk management at the expense of patient confidentiality, a 
development that could significantly impede the practice and success of 
psychotherapy. A middle ground, that both protects potential victims 
and respects the need for confidentiality, is a better alternative. Under 
this scheme, the triggering mechanisms of the duty to warn would once 
again be narrowly construed. Instead, the LPS Act should be utilized as 
a more appropriate and narrowly tailored procedure for dealing with 
potentially dangerous patients and family communications, providing for 
crisis management and assessment when the therapist has probable cause 
to believe that the patient is a danger to self or to others. In the final 
analysis, neither confidentiality nor victims' rights can conscionably be 
traded away, because both patients and the public are better served when 
potentially violent individuals get the treatment they need. 
GWYNNETH F. SMITH * 
practitioners and in-patient facilities in order to strengthen private practitioners' ability to advise and 
consult on LPS holds involving their private patients. The law should be amended to state that if a 
dispute arises between a hospital staff member and a private practice therapist regarding patient 
admission or discharge, an LPS Hearing officer would then be called in to neutrally evaluate the 
probable cause under the LPS Act. 
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